Systematic reviews of public participation focus on environmental assessment and decision-making. Further synthesis and research is needed to identify elements of structures and processes for effective scientific communication in public forums on a range of social issues (e.g. B, biomedical research, health policy, gene editing, educational policy) and types of controversy. In addition, as best practices in public engagement suggest that it takes place early, research is needed to determine to what extent and how the communication of science in formal public participation processes can be effective once a topic has become controversial and the science with the topic has become controversial. Kuhn`s second account of rational disagreements, discussed by Seidel, is based on Kuhn`s influential ideas about the role of values in the choice of theory. Kuhn believed that since each choice of scientific theory will be based on a list of five values (accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fertility), there is no single rational way to interpret and weigh these values against each other. While Seidel interprets this point, Kuhn essentially argues that the choice of theory is underdetermined by this list of values. This argument differs considerably – even incompatiblely – from the previous argument of methodological incommensurability, as it implies that this list of values is or should be accepted by scientists, regardless of the paradigm they adopt. Be that as it may, Seidel points out that Kuhn motivates this presentation of the choice of theory in part by effortlessly explaining how scientists can rationally come to disagreements about theories, allowing their disagreements to flow from scientists interpreting and weighing these values differently – but just as rationally. Seidel, however, also presents his own competing narrative of how rational disagreements can arise that, if successful, would undermine Kuhn`s motivation for his representation of the choice of theory. These are just some of the questions raised by the work collected in this volume.

There will undoubtedly be considerable disagreements about how these kinds of questions should be answered themselves – but that, as we now know, is obvious. These results also provide insight into why one reason might be preferred over another. We see a mixed trend of global and specific impacts on the baseline probability assessment. Political ideology and conspiracy ideas have shown global implications (mediated by the credibility of science) on probability assessments of all reasons for scientific disputes. This suggests that laymen who do not consider science to be credible do not exclusively make rational judgments, as they view judgments as one reason at a time. If this were the case, we would only expect specific valuation models. For example, bias as a factor that clearly makes scientists unreliable would be rated relatively high, especially for those who also favor conspiracy theory ideas. Competence could be classified as secondary, because even though all scientists are considered incompetent, this reason postulates some as more competent than others, which can make them a little less reliable. And complexity would ultimately be evaluated as a reason that has nothing to do with the qualities of the scientists themselves and therefore with credibility.

These global effects, regardless of the nature of the reason, imply that it is more of a signal of general distrust – “if I know what I am doing about scientists, each of these explanations might be valid for their disagreements” – rather than an explanation of the choice of reason. Previous work differed in the number and type of topics they had used to illustrate intra-scientific disputes. They also differed as to whether disputes had arisen between individuals or groups of scientists, their reasons, their measurements, the explanatory factors tested and the nationality of the sample. Laymen might more easily attribute disputes between individual scientists to self-interest or values than to large groups of scientists who may not share the same type of employer or motivation. Nationality may or may not influence the results, depending on whether there is a broadly similar reaction – e.B. because the institution of science is conducted in the same way everywhere and laymen interpret science in the same way wherever they live – or culturally different reactions. These differences in method make it difficult to assess differences in results. For example, the general content of the explanatory reasons put forward by laymen for scientific disputes is clearly similar.

These include what scientists study (complexity), how they study it (methodological and other decisions; Competence) and their conscious or unconscious motivations for studying (personal interests, values). The limited number of studies in different countries also suggests some convergence of these categories of reasons by laymen, suggesting that cultural differences may be minimal. However, this conclusion must be preliminary, as no study has yet applied the same measures to lay people recruited from two or more cultures. Whether it`s the right amount of vitamin D or the root causes of poverty, confusing scientific disagreements surround us. There is an old joke: ask 10 doctors a question, you will get 11 answers. In addition to sowing confusion, constant disagreements can undermine belief in science. You can almost hear a politician say, “If scientists can`t decide, why should I believe everything they say?” Although the public has a generally positive attitude towards science and scientists, some contentious issues with a scientific component often become controversial. As mentioned in Chapter 1, part of this public controversy stems from the fact that science itself is inconclusive, and part of a gap between what science shows and long-standing perceptions of common sense or deeply rooted moral, ethical, or social values.

Often, the moral, ethical, or social implications of using science to develop or use technology or for decision-making can be more controversial than the scientific discoveries themselves (Sarewitz, 2015). A public debate on these issues – between the scientific community, policy makers and citizens – can help to discover commonalities between people with different values. While this is not always the case, clear scientific information can allow people to make more informed decisions. Healthy debate can also strengthen science, challenge its claims, and lead to a push for better forms of evidence. The contributions collected in this special issue highlight the diversity of philosophical questions arising from the well-known phenomenon of disunity in science. They also open up other avenues for studying scientific disagreements and related topics. 1998; Rosa et al., 2013). In such cases, the required extrapolation almost inevitably increases uncertainty and requires careful evaluation; it also means that members of the local public may have knowledge that, while unscientific, may be essential to the accurate application of scientific knowledge to the local context (Dietz, 2013b; Wynne, 1989). Interestingly, in the event of an ongoing controversy, members of the public can acquire considerable expertise in the relevant scientific field (e.g.B. Brown, 1992; Epstein, 1995; Kaplan, 2000; Kinchy et al., 2014). Why don`t scientists agree at all? A number of potential causes focus on the experts themselves. One or more experts may make an inaccurate claim because of their incompetence (i.e., they are not experts at all [5]) and/or the fundamental limitations of human judgment [6], or they may intentionally or unintentionally distort claims based on idiosyncratic attitudes, beliefs, or self-interests [7].

Another expert-oriented cause may be different methodological decisions resulting from the abilities or preferences of individual scientists or historical developments in their respective fields or sub-disciplines. Alternatively, disagreements between experts in scientific fields may be due to an irreducible uncertainty of the world itself and can be understood as part of the normal process of science [8, 9]. From this perspective, it is inevitable that experts will disagree on complex and uncertain real-world problems. It is the complexity and uncertainty inherent in the world that leads to disagreements over how to conceptualize problems, which research methods to use, etc. Conceptually, these various expert- and global-focused reasons are neither logically nor practically mutually exclusive. For any dispute between scientists, there may be several causes, and these causes may differ from one dispute to another. However, we are interested here in the layman`s perception of the reasons or causes of these disputes. The survey tool began with questions aimed at uncovering previous awareness and interest in disputes between scientists: “Sometimes a large group of scientists disagrees with another large group of scientists about the causes or effects of a natural event or natural technology.