On 5 May 1994, the official delegates of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia met in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, to sign a protocol (the Bishkek Protocol), which later turned into a ceasefire agreement. On 20 February 1993, talks began in Rome with the participation of the representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, the United States and the Chairman of the Minsk Conference, Mr. Rafaelli. At the end of the talks, it was agreed that the parties would ensure a comprehensive ceasefire and that international observers would be stationed in the region. However, Armenia launched and occupied an attack on the Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan on 27 March 1993. After the occupation of Kalbadshar, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 822, which condemned the occupation and called for it to end immediately. [9] Many other states and international organizations have also called on Armenia to cease its attacks and occupation. The new escalation of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which began on September 27, 2020, suddenly became one of the main topics on the global agenda due to the possibilities of participation of Russia and Turkey in the conflict, the orientation of important energy projects in the region, the major humanitarian crisis and other issues. Although there have been several other stormy skirmishes between the two countries in recent years, this time the escalation is much wider and longer than expected.

This immediately reminds us of the ceasefire agreements. The parties to the conflict agreed on a ceasefire (on 10 October, 17 October[2] and 26 October[3]). However, the armed clashes have never ceased and the parties constantly accuse each other of not respecting the ceasefire. In order to fully understand the nature of the ceasefire and the possibility of a complete cessation of fire in the Armenian-Azerbaijani war, it would be useful to examine the history of the ceasefire during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The new ceasefire agreement sparked anger in Armenia as protesters stormed parliament, beat the president and reportedly ransacked the prime minister`s office. [17] Laurence Broers, “The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict Defaulting to War,” www.chathamhouse.org/2016/07/nagorny-karabakh-conflict-defaulting-war On August 18, 1993, another ceasefire agreement was reached under Russian mediation,[12] but this process also led to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories – Fuzuli and Jabrayil districts in Azerbaijan – on August 23, 1993. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh is not mentioned once in the ceasefire agreement, nor is the OSCE Minsk Group. After the end of hostilities, the so-called “Republic of Artsakh” seems to continue to function de facto, albeit in a more limited area. In the Armenian capital Yerevan, according to local media, a large crowd gathered to protest the deal. They burst into parliament and government buildings and shouted, “We will not give up.” The ceasefire agreement provides for the liberation of economic and transport links, including the construction of new roads through Armenia linking the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (the enclave of Azerbaijan bordering Armenia, Iran and Turkey) to the western regions of Azerbaijan. Russian border guards will monitor these transport links. Previously, Nakhchivan was connected to Azerbaijan via Iran.

Another initiative came from Russia. On 19 September 1992, the Defence Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia, under the mediation of Russia, signed an agreement in Sochi. The agreement contained a provision on the implementation of the ceasefire of 25 September 1992 and a number of other issues. [8] But even this agreement was not respected, because the parties constantly accused each other of violating the ceasefire and because Armenia insisted that the Armenians of the former NKAO officially participate in the talks. President Putin said the deal would include an exchange of prisoners of war, with “all economic and transport contacts to be released.” An agreement that Armenians see as a capitulation will not be a reliable basis for a more lasting peace. Although it is difficult for them to accept it, measures should be taken to mitigate the shock and prevent Azerbaijani incursions. This means, in particular, that Armenians can safely return to, leave or remain in Nagorno-Karabakh. The responsibility in this matter lies primarily with Russia, which should both cement and clarify the agreement.

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